In this paper, we compare the effectiveness of Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) with that of Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs), where both are trained on sequences of API calls. We compare our results to static analysis using HMMs trained on sequences of opcodes, and show that dynamic analysis achieves significantly stronger results in many cases. Furthermore, in comparing our two dynamic analysis approaches, we find that using PHMMs consistently outperforms our technique based on HMMs.
INTRODUCTION
In this research, we rely on the concept of software birthmarks to determine features. Software birthmarks are inherent characteristics that can be used to identify particular software [20, 30] . The goal is to obtain a unique identifier for each executable. We can then use these birthmarks to measure the similarity between two executables. If the birthmarks of the two files are sufficiently similar, then we assume that one software is closely related to the other. This strategy has been the basis of a variety of techniques for identifying challenging classes of metamorphic malware [12, 20, 30, 29, 32, 34] .
Software birthmarks can be either static or dynamic [12] . Static birthmarks are characteristics that can be extracted from a program without executing it [34] . For example, a static birthmark could be based on an extracted opcode sequence or other features of the disassembled code. In Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. contrast, dynamic birthmarks are obtained from a program when it is executed ore emulated [30, 34] . An example of a dynamic birthmark is the sequence of API calls that occur when a program is executed [30] .
The previous work in [16] explored static birthmarks for malware detection; this paper instead focuses on dynamic birthmarks. Specifically, we use Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) and Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs) as the bases for our detection techniques. Both HMM-based analysis [33] and PHMM-based analysis [3] have been previously applied to the malware detection problem. However, we know of no previous work that provides such a direct comparison of static and dynamic techniques as we provide in this paper. In the process, we also obtain some insights into the relative strengths and weaknesses of the machine learning techniques considered.
To compare the effectiveness of our dynamic analysis techniques, we compare static and dynamic analysis results on substantial malware datasets using ROC analysis [7] . We show that significantly stronger malware detection results can be obtained using dynamic analysis of software birthmarks, as compared to static analysis, particularly when PHMMs are utilized. More precisely, our results show that it is more beneficial to consider the sequential information contained in the API calls that appear during program execution, rather than to statically analyze the opcodes in a program. In our tests, properly tuned PHMMs built from dynamic birthmarks always outperform HMMs built from the same birthmarks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a very brief introduction to malware and malware detection techniques. Section 3 gives a brief survey of related work involving these machine learning techniques. In Section 4, we discuss implementation details. Experimental results and a discussion thereof is given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and we mention possible future work.
BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss relevant background topics. Specifically, we cover AV techniques and software birthmarks.
Anti-Virus and Anti-Anti-Virus Strategies
Signature-based detection involves scanning files in a system in search of specific bit patterns. An anti-virus product has a database of patterns or signatures, and if a match is found, then that file is likely to be malware. It is essential that the signature database be updated frequently; otherwise new malware will go undetected.
Signature detection has long been the main approach used to identify malware, largely due to its efficiency and low false positive rate. Therefore, virus authors have worked to change the signature of their malware while still providing the same functionality. Malware writers use a variety of techniques to evade signature detection, including encryption, packing, and code morphing.
In the face of increasingly effective techniques for evading signature detection, various advanced detection strategies have been developed. We consider a few of these approaches.
Unlike signature based detection, static heuristics analysis does not identify malware by scanning for specific signatures. Instead, it analyses the behavior, structure, and other attributes for virus-like qualities [5] . This technique can be used to identify zero-day malware as well as existing malware, since it identifies the probability of a file being infected by searching for "virus-like" behavior or structure. While static heuristics analysis has the ability to detect malware even before it can infect a computer, such an approach tends to have a high false positive rate [5] .
A behavior blocker executes the program and closely monitors it for suspicious activities. If any suspicious activity is encountered, the behavior blocker stops the program [5] . Behavior blockers make use of dynamic signatures.
In general, dynamic detection techniques only consider the instructions that have actually been executed. Dead code insertion, for example, has no impact on dynamic analysis. Consequently, we can view dynamic analysis as stripping away one layer of obfuscation. However, the tradeoff is that dynamic analysis is based only on the parts of the code that actually execute.
Software Birthmarks
Software birthmarks are characteristics that are derived from a particular software. Such birthmarks can be classified as either static and dynamic. Static birthmarks are characteristics that can be extracted from the program without executing the code. For example, an extracted opcode sequence can be considered a static birthmark. In contrast, dynamic birthmarks are characteristics that are obtained from a program when it is executed. For example, API calls that are recorded when the program is executed could serve as a dynamic birthmark. Next, we briefly discuss examples of malware analysis techniques involving static or dynamic birthmarks for malware detection An advantage of static analysis is that it is generally faster and more efficient than dynamic analysis. Compared to dynamic analysis techniques, static analysis may also be safer since it does not involve execution of the malware. The drawback of a static approach is that it may be easier to defeat by code obfuscation techniques [5] .
In [20] , the authors propose a static -gram based birthmark. This birthmark is computed by extracting opcode sequences of length . The effectiveness of this birthmark is tested on randomly selected applications and on programs that are semantically different, but which accomplish the same task. The authors identify an optimum value at which the credibility and resilience of the birthmark is maximized. A somewhat similar approach is applied to the malware detection problem in the paper [16] .
Dynamic birthmarks, such as API calls obtained at runtime, can be difficult for malware writers to defeat [30] , since dynamic birthmarks are relatively resilient to code obfuscation, as compared to static birthmarks. The tradeoff is that the cost of dynamic analysis is generally higher and there is often some risk involved in extracting dynamic features.
In [6] , the authors construct a -gram based birthmark by traversing a window of length over an opcode sequence in the case of the static analysis and over an executable trace for the dynamic analysis case. The authors evaluated the strength of the dynamic birthmark technique by comparing the results obtained from static and dynamic cases when code obfuscation is applied. They show that the dynamic -gram birthmark is much more robust than the static case.
Anderson [1] discusses a graph technique based dynamic instruction traces. The constructed graphs are Markov chains consisting of instructions and transition probabilities. A similarity matrix is created using the graph kernels for different instruction traces. A Support Vector Machine is applied to the similarity matrix to perform the malware classification. The author of [1] shows that this technique is an improvement over previous work.
Tamada et al. [30] use both the API call sequences and the API call frequencies that are collected during runtime as dynamic birthmarks. The authors leverage the fact that different programs using the same APIs do not have the same order of API calls upon execution.
Fukuda et al. [12] consider the operand stack runtime behavior of a Java Virtual Machine. This is a dynamic birthmark, due to its unique nature at runtime. This birthmark exhibits a high tolerance to code changes and a good ability to discern programs that could be a pirated version of another.
Our work consists of developing and analyzing malware detection strategies comparing static and dynamic birthmarks. We use Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [24] and Profile Hidden Markov Models (PHMMs) [9] for classification, which provides a method to quantify the strength of sequential information contained extracted features.
HMMs frequently appear in information security research; representative examples include [2, 33] . In contrast, the PHMM technique is applied far less frequently, and often with limited success [3] , or it is only successful in very narrow circumstances [13] .
RELATED WORK
Wong and Stamp [33] have demonstrated the effectiveness of HMMs for detecting challenging classes of metamorphic malware [17] based on opcode sequences. Austin et al. [4] extend this idea to a dueling HMM strategy, that is, a multisensor approach that handles more complex situations by using models of both benign and malicious files. Kalbhor et al. [14] highlight how the overhead of the dueling HMM strategy can be reduced to levels approaching that of Wong and Stamp's approach by using a tiered analysis. The central idea in [14] is to quickly analyze files with the simpler approach first, and only use the more expensive multi-sensor approach in the more challenging cases. Annachhatre et al. [2] show how this multi-sensor approach can be useful in the challenging problem of malware classification, by using a clustering technique based on HMM scores.
Filiol and Josse [11] discuss statistical testing simulability and describe how an attacker might use information about the defender's detection strategy to evade detection. Madenur Sridhara and Stamp [25] use a similar strategy in the design of an experimental metamorphic worm, MWOR. The MWOR worm relies primarily on dead code insertion, which seems to be one of the more effective metamorphic techniques at evading HMM-based detection, or any detection strategy that is based on static analysis.
Attaluri et al. [3] use profile hidden Markov models to detect metamorphic malware based on static opcode sequences. The approach works well against certain classes of metamorphic malware, but is less effective when the blocks of code are shifted relatively far apart. This paper extends the work in [3] by considering dynamic birthmarks. While PHMMs trained on static data did not prove to be particularly strong for malware detection, in this paper we show that PHMMs are an extremely powerful tool for malware detection based on dynamic birthmarks.
IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we review the design of each of our malware detection systems. First, we discuss our HMM-based approach, then our PHMM-based technique.
Static Analysis Using HMMs
As in previous research based on static HMMs [33, 4] , we consider opcode sequences. We employ IDA Pro to disassemble and generate asm files. From these files, we extract the mnemonic opcodes for training and testing our models. Labels, operands, and other details are discarded.
We construct HMMs from the mnemonic opcode sequences. Following the approach taken by Wong and Stamp [33] , we use = 2 hidden states. We also use 800 iterations of the Baum-Welch re-estimation algorithm when training all of our models. In addition, we employ five-fold crossvalidation. That is, for each experiment, the family dataset is partitioned into five equal subsets, say, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. Then we train a model using 1, 2, 3, and 4, and we use the resulting model to score the files in 5, as well as all files in the representative benign set. This process is repeated five times, with a different subset reserved for testing in each "fold". The use of cross validation serves to smooth any biases in the data, while also maximizing the number of scores from a given dataset.
Dynamic Analysis Using HMMs
To compare the effectiveness of dynamic versus static analysis, we also consider HMM analysis based on dynamic birthmarks. For the dynamic birthmark, we extract API calls at runtime. One useful advantage of this approach is that API calls would appear to be more resilient against obvious code obfuscation techniques, as compared to opcode sequences.
To collect the API calls, we use the Buster Sandbox Analyzer [8] (BSA). BSA logs information about file system changes, windows registry changes, port changes, etc. BSA also executes files in a sandbox so that malware can be run safely.
Once the API call sequences are produced, they are used for training and testing in the same manner as discussed in Section 4.1. We note that there is an additional parameter in this case, namely, the amount of time that we run the software to generate the sequences.
Dynamic Analysis Using PHMMs
A generic view of a PHMM is given in Figure 1 . Note that a PHMM includes match ( ), insert ( ), and delete ( ) states, while a standard HMM does not allow for insertions or deletions. Also, a PHMM explicitly accounts for positional information within sequences, whereas an HMM does not.
For our PHMM score, we use the same API call sequences as in the dynamic HMM case. Once we have the sequences of API calls for a given malware family, we generate pairwise alignments, from which the Multiple Sequence Alignment (MSA) will be constructed.
Some preprocessing is required before we can construct pairwise alignments. We followed the general approach in [3] , that is, the API calls are first sorted by frequency of occurrence. In our data, the top 36 API calls constitute at least 99.8% of the total API calls for each family tested. Consequently, we only consider the top 36 API calls, with all remaining API calls mapped to a single "other" state. This preprocessing step strengthens the resulting models.
The next step involves creating a substitution matrix and a gap penalty function. We use the Feng-Doolittle algorithm [10] to create our MSA from the pairwise alignments. After constructing the MSA, we use it to build the PHMM, and once we have built the PHMM, we use the forward algorithm to score sequences against the PHMM. Details on the forward algorithm can be found in any standard introduction to PHMMs [9, 23] . For more details on the specific pairwise alignment and MSA construction strategies used in this research, see [31] .
EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our dynamic and static analysis techniques and present our results. Specifically, we use a static HMM that is trained based on extracted opcodes as a baseline to compare against both HMMs and PHMMs trained on dynamically extracted API call sequences. We show that dynamic analysis is superior for the challenging test cases that we consider, and we show that PHMMs outperform HMMs.
Setup
For all experiments, we have used the Oracle VM Virtual Box. The host machine has an Intel R ○ Core TM i5-3317U CPU with 1.7Ghz processor, 6GB RAM, 64-bit system, and Windows 8.1 operating system. The guest machine used in our experiments was an Oracle Virtual Box 4.3.16 VM with a base memory of 3310MB, 6GB RAM, 32 bit system, running Windows 7. The training and testing of the HMMs and PHMM are done in the host machine whereas the API calls and opcode extraction are done in the guest machine.
Dataset
For our malware set, we have used the following seven malware families [21] .
• Cridex is a worm that multiplies and spreads through removable drives. It downloads malicious programs onto the system it has attacked [26] . • Harebot is a backdoor that affects Windows systems. The Harebot backdoor enables hackers to gain access to the compromised system and steal information [22] .
• Security Shield is fake anti-virus software that falsely claims to protect the system from malware. Security Shield then tries to convince the user to pay money to remove these nonexistent threats [18] .
• SmartHdd targets Windows users. It tricks the users into thinking that it is a legitimate hardware monitoring tool (SMART). It generates fake messages indicating that the hard drive is failing and tries to convince the user to pay to fix the supposed issues. It also disables antivirus software in the compromised system [15] .
• Winwebsec is a Windows Trojan that impersonates anti-malware software and displays fake messages stating that the user's system has been infected. Once installed, it tries to convince the user to pay for a fake anti-malware product [19] .
• Zbot is another Trojan. Zbot steals confidential information such as online credentials [27] .
• Zeroaccess is a Trojan that attacks Windows systems. It uses a botnet to download other malicious programs onto the compromised system [28] . Table 1 lists the number of files from each of the malware families used in our experiments. In our experiments, we use a benign dataset consisting of 20 Windows executable files. These executables are available in Windows 7 or as freeware and offer a reasonable representative benign set. The complete list of these 20 executable files can be found in [31] . 
Results
After performing each experiment, we plot the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve and compute the area under the ROC curve (AUC). The ROC curve is obtained from a scatterplot by graphing the true positive rate (TPR) versus the false positive rate (FPR) as the threshold varies through the range of observed values. The AUC can be interpreted as the probability that a randomly-selected positive instance scores higher than a randomly selected negative instance [7] . Consequently, an AUC of 1.0 represents the ideal case where a threshold exists that results in no classification errors. On the other hand, an AUC of 0.5 implies that the underlying binary classifier is no better than flipping a coin.
We first perform both static and dynamic analysis based on HMMs, using extracted opcode sequences and API calls, respectively. We then plot the ROC curve for each case and calculate the AUC. Next, we apply a similar analysis using PHMMs based on API calls. For all experiments, we use the seven malware families discussed above.
HMMs based on static opcode sequences have performed well when tested on various malware families [2, 25, 33] . The AUC of 0.676 for the static HMM indicates that Security Shield represents a challenging detection problem, and hence the AUC value of 1.0 for the dynamic HMM is impressive.
We have performed the same experiments on each of the seven malware families discussed in Section 5.2. That is, for each family, we have tested an HMM based on static opcodes and both an HMM and PHMM based on dynamic API calls. The results for the static and dynamic HMMs are summarized in Table 2 . From the results in Table 2 we see that the dynamic HMM outperforms the static HMM in almost every case. The average AUC for the dynamic HMM cases is 0.976, whereas the average AUC for the static HMM cases is 0.785. This clearly shows the advantage of dynamic birthmarks.
Next, we consider PHMMs trained on the same dynamic birthmarks used for the dynamic HMMs. For a PHMM, the number of sequences used to train is a critical parameter. Table 3 contains results for our PHMM experiments, where "group " means that we trained the corresponding PHMM using sequences. In each case, we were able to achieve an AUC of 1.0, and once we have attained such a result, there is no need for further experimentation with the parameter .
The PHMM results in Table 3 are somewhat surprising when compared to PHMM results obtained in previous research. In the paper [3] , a PHMM is trained on static opcode sequences and the results are significantly worse than those obtained from HMMs trained on the same data. Apparently, this is due to transpositions, which result in opcodes being shifted to different locations within the binaries, causing gaps to proliferate when constructing the MSA, and thereby weakening the PHMM. In contrast, for the dynamic API calls considered in this research it is far more difficult to obfuscate the sequential information. That is, the positional information in API call sequences is highly informative, whereas the positional information in opcode sequences is much less so.
Finally, in Figure 2 we compare the results for our static HMM, dynamic HMM, and dynamic PHMM, in the form of a bar graph. While the dynamic HMM results are indeed very strong, the PHMM results are better; indeed, the PHMM results are optimal.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As malware has become increasingly difficult to detect with traditional techniques, new approaches are needed, and machine learning based tools are a promising avenue. Hidden Markov models are one such technique that has been used effectively for malware detection in previous work [2, 4, 14, 25, 33] . In contrast, Profile Hidden Markov Models seem to have rarely been studied in this context, with previous results being mixed, at best [3] .
In this paper, we have shown the efficacy of detection tools using HMMs built from dynamic birthmarks; specifically API calls. In fact, this dynamic approach far outperforms previous static analysis tools that relied on HMMs based on opcodes. The average area under the ROC curve (AUC) that we obtained over all malware families in our dataset was 0.976 when using our dynamic HMMs. In contrast, the average AUC when using static HMMs was only 0.785. The static HMMs have shown strong results in several previous studies, which indicates that our dataset presents a relatively challenging case. This makes the dynamic HMM results all the more impressive.
We also experimented with Profile Hidden Markov Models. A PHMM can be viewed as a generalization of an HMM that take positional information into account. Our PHMM experiments, based again on dynamic API call sequences, outperform the HMMs in every case. In fact, the PHMMs achieved ideal separation in every case, with an AUC of 1.0. These results show that PHMMs can be a very powerful tool for certain types of software analysis problems.
For future work, we intend to further explore different morphing and obfuscation techniques and test how effective our techniques are against various strategies. In particular, it would be interesting to try to defeat HMM-and especially PHMM-techniques that are based on dynamic API calls. By doing so, we can hope to strengthen these detection techniques. Also, while the dynamic birthmarks considered in this paper are based on API calls, other dynamic birthmarks might provide useful information. We also note that a related strategy would be to combine API calls with other types of dynamic birthmarks using, say, Support Vector Machines or some boosting strategy so as to develop an even more robust malware detection technique. Finally, it would be interesting to test such dynamic analysis tools in the situation where we want to monitor untrusted code at runtime.
